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Abstract—A major restructuring of electricity markets takes
place worldwide, pursuing maximum economic efficiency. In
most modern electricity markets, including the widely adapted
Locational Marginal Price (LMP) market, efficiency is only
guaranteed under the assumption of perfect competition. More-
over, market design is heavily focused on deterministic con-
ventional generation. Electricity markets, though, are vulner-
able to strategic behaviors and challenged by the increased
penetration of renewable energy generation. In this paper, we
cope with the aforementioned bottlenecks by investigating the
application of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction in a two-
stage stochastic electricity market. The VCG mechanism achieves
incentive-compatibility by rewarding market participants for
their contribution towards market efficiency, being attractive
from both market operation and participants perspectives. Both
traditional and VCG market-clearing approaches are explored
and compared, investigating as well the impact of increasing
wind power penetration. The main shortcoming of VCG, i.e.,
not ensuring revenue-adequacy, is quantified in terms of market
budget imbalance for various levels of wind power penetration.
To this end, a novel ex-post budget redistribution scheme is
proposed, which achieves to partially recover budget deficit.
Index Terms—electricity market, incentive-compatibility,
stochastic market-clearing, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, budget im-
balance redistribution
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
Under perfect competition1 in Locational Marginal Price
(LMP) markets, energy price is turned into a parameter that
cannot be controlled by any of the market agents. Perfect
competition, though, is subject to the assumption that all
market agents are truthful with respect to their marginal costs
or utilities. However, market agents are in general rational and
aim at maximizing their profit from market participation. Thus,
they may offer to the market at prices different than their true
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1Perfect competition refers to the condition where the participating agents
cannot exercise market power in order to influence the clearing outcomes
of the market [1]. In terms of electricity markets, under perfect competi-
tion, market agents reveal their true preferences, e.g. their actual marginal
costs/utilities.
marginal costs to affect market prices for their own benefit, i.e.,
increasing their profit. Such strategic behaviors may jeopardize
market efficiency by changing the economic dispatch and
decreasing social welfare. There are several empirical papers
that assess the existence of “market power” in real-world
electricity markets, e.g., [2]–[8]. Motivated by the limitation
of LMP markets to ensure truthful market participation, we
explore in this paper an incentive-compatible mechanism that
has the ability to induce truthful information from market
participants. More specifically, we apply the Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) auction [9]–[11] on a two-stage stochastic elec-
tricity market [12], [13]. The VCG payment scheme imposes
truthful participation as dominant strategy to market agents
(both producers and consumers) without, however, enforcing
them to publicly reveal any private information.
An additional limitation of the current electricity market
design globally, is the fact that it is heavily focused on
conventional deterministic generation. However, modern elec-
tricity markets are challenged by the accelerated penetration
of variable wind power generation. Thus, we use in this paper
a two-stage stochastic electricity market setup to properly
take into account the wind power uncertainty at the day-
ahead stage. This implies that the dispatch decisions in the
day-ahead stage are made, while considering the recourse
actions in the real-time for each plausible wind power scenario.
This scheme is expected to better accommodate wind power
uncertainty, leading to an increased market efficiency (i.e.,
lower system cost in expectation), assuming that a realistic
range and probability distribution of scenarios are considered
[12], [13]. The benefits and shortcomings of the stochastic
market design are discussed in [14] and [15].
Using the aforementioned two-stage stochastic setup, we
evaluate the VCG mechanism against the LMP mechanism,
under both perfect and imperfect competition. In particular, we
aim at exploring the applicability of a market mechanism that
would set the two objectives at once: ensuring perfect competi-
tion in the market through an incentive-compatible mechanism,
while facilitating the integration of massive renewable sources
with stochastic generation.
The way the LMP- and the VCG-based mechanisms clear
the market is identical. They both solve an optimization
problem whose objective function is to maximize the market’s
social welfare, constrained by market agents’ offers, grid
constraints and nodal power balance equalities. However, these
two mechanisms are differentiated in the way they calculate
2producers’ payments and consumers’ charges. In the LMP-
based mechanism, the market operator pays producers based
on their production quantity times the market price. Thus,
those producers have an incentive to possibly affect market
prices to their own benefit by strategic offering. However, in
the VCG-based market mechanism, participants’ payments are
defined as the economic difference in social welfare resulted
by their participation in the auction. For example, the payment
of the market operator to a producer corresponds to a profit
equal to the difference between the value of market’s social
welfare when that producer participates in the market and the
value of social welfare when that producer is out of the market.
Therefore, the producer’s profit is indeed the economic value
that the producer brings to the market. From this producer’s
perspective, who aims at maximizing its profit, the value of
social welfare without its participation in the market is a
parameter (not a variable), and therefore the producer is not
able to affect market’s outcomes without participating in it.
Hence, producer’s objective falls into maximizing the value of
the social welfare when participating in the market, to earn the
highest possible profit. Interestingly, the highest social welfare
is obtained when the producers offer at their true marginal
costs. This is the reason why the VCG mechanism guarantees
incentive-compatibility, i.e., it eliminates the market power
of market participants, either producers or consumers, by
endogenizing social welfare into their optimization objective.
In traditional LMP markets, payments to producers and
charges of the demands are calculated based on the unique
equilibrium price, resulting in a budget-balanced market, i.e.,
demand charges are equal to generation payments2. Therefore,
revenue-adequacy in the market is guaranteed, since the mar-
ket’s revenue from demand payments is sufficient to cover gen-
eration costs. Note that this is the case if non-convexities, e.g.,
binary variables representing the on/off commitment status
of conventional generators, are ignored. However, payments
under the VCG mechanism are not calculated based on a
unique price. Instead, for each of the scheduled producers
and consumers, payments are calculated independently of the
other participants’ payments. Therefore, VCG does not, by
design, guarantee budget-balance, since consumers’ valuation
of electricity may not be equal to the suppliers’ payments.
The inability of VCG mechanism to guarantee strict budget
balance, i.e., payments of consumers being equal to payments
to the producers, has been mathematically proven in [16].
More specifically, under the context of a double-sided market
as the one we study in this paper, this may lead to budget
imbalance towards both directions, i.e., positive or negative
[17], [18].
Table I summarizes the main properties of the VCG mech-
anism, comparing them with the corresponding ones of the
LMP markets under both competitive and strategic setups.
The LMP market achieves maximum efficiency, cost-recovery
and revenue-adequacy only under the assumption that com-
2This budget-balance condition still holds in the LMP markets with
congested transmission network, since the resulted surplus corresponds to the
so-called congestion rent, which is eventually paid to the transmission owner
or to the financial transmission right holders.
petition in the market is perfect3. Although regulators may
impose regulatory policies to mitigate market power (e.g.,
by imposing price offer caps), these interventions do not
guarantee achieving a perfect competition. By design, the
LMP mechanism leads to a perfect competition only if the
number of market participants grows to infinity, under which
the LMP market outcomes converge to the VCG outcomes
[19]. On the other hand, the application of a VCG auction
to an electricity market ensures maximum efficiency, cost-
recovery and incentive-compatibility as dominant strategies.
It may, however, result in budget deficit for the market
operator which should be exogenously recovered based on
an additional payment scheme (similar to uplift mechanisms
in the US markets [20]). In this work, we quantify the
corresponding budget imbalance (positive or negative) un-
der a network-constrained market structure and propose an
ex-post mechanism to partially4 recover revenue-adequacy.
The latter redistributes budget imbalance, by proportionally
charging (rewarding) agents for their contribution towards
negative (positive) budget imbalance. The proposed mecha-
nism, motivated by relevant economic literature for single-
sided markets [22], aims at reducing budget imbalance while
making it practically difficult for agents to violate incentive-
compatibility and market efficiency5. It should be noted that
since these four desirable properties cannot be met at the
same time by a single market mechanism [21], it is up to the
priorities of market regulators and policy makers to decide
which properties are the most important to keep, at the cost
of relaxing another property.
For the purpose of this assessment we apply and compare
VCG and LMP mechanisms in two different test cases. Firstly,
a 24-bus test system is used which is large enough to allow
a thorough comparison of the two mechanisms, while at the
same time it makes feasible the calculation of the market
equilibrium under imperfect competition. Then, in order to
explore the practical implementation of the VCG mechanism
a second test case is presented based on a 118-bus test system.
In the latter case, the LMP market-clearing under imperfect
competition is ignored since the case study focuses on the
scalability of the LMP versus the VCG mechanism, which is
not related to the competitiveness of the market.
B. Literature Review and Contributions
Considering the relatively recent restructuring of electricity
markets, mechanism design theory and its application to
electricity markets is not yet widely explored in the technical
literature. In this section we offer a review of the most
relevant research literature, followed by the corresponding
contributions of the present paper.
3In a stochastic market setup, these market properties are ensured in
expectation, but not necessarily for each individual scenario [12]. It is possible
to guarantee cost-recovery and revenue-adequacy by scenario, but at the cost
of losing some desirable market properties, such as market efficiency [14].
4No market design satisfies at the same time efficiency, cost-recovery,
incentive-compatibility and revenue-adequacy [21].
5The redistribution payment is independent of the agents’ decisions, while
it is practically hard for them to form a strategy that can impact the budget
deficit, which is the basis of the proposed redistribution mechanism.
3TABLE I
PROPERTIES OF LMP AND VCG MARKET MECHANISMS
Competitive
LMP?
Strategic
LMP
VCG
Market Efficiency1 (in exp.) 3 7 3
Cost-Recovery2 (in exp.) 3 3 3
Revenue-Adequacy3 (in exp.) 3 3 7
Incentive-Compatibility4 3(assumed) 7 3
?Competitive LMP is an ideal model, used as benchmark.
1Market efficiency is maximized when market outcomes align with the
maximum social welfare.
2Cost-recovery implies that producers’ profit is non-negative.
3Revenue-adequacy implies that market operator receives enough revenue to
recover the expenses of market operation, i.e., no budget deficit in the market.
4A mechanism is called incentive-compatible if every participant can maxi-
mize its objective just by acting according to its true preferences.
In [23], authors propose a market design that achieves
efficiency despite missing information, ensuring incentive-
compatibility and cost-recovery. Producers’ payments are di-
vided into two parts, one being the cost compensation and the
other one being an information payment, specifically designed
to elicit truthful marginal costs from producers. However,
the study does not ensure that payments to producers are
minimized, due to the nature of the dual payment scheme.
Authors in [17] investigate VCG auction for supply and
demand bidding in an energy market with conventional pro-
ducers. The advantages and shortcomings of VCG are then
explored without, however, considering the impact of wind
power uncertainty which is dominant in modern electricity
markets. Furthermore, [17] highlights that the mechanism will
lead to budget deficit, which could potentially be recovered
by additional payments from consumers.
In a more recent study, [24] introduces an incentive-
compatible pool-based market design based on a Bayesian ap-
proach to cope with some of the aforementioned shortcomings.
In this study, authors consider prior common knowledge of the
individual costs probability distribution, without accounting
for wind power uncertainty. Finally, recent research paper
[18] applies VCG mechanism to wholesale electricity markets
considering wind uncertainty. The results are then compared to
a (ideally) perfectly competitive LMP market, considering re-
serve allocation in day-ahead (DA) to anticipate real-time (RT)
imbalances. In contrast to the present paper, the aforemen-
tioned study does not anticipate RT market operation through
a two-stage market-clearing approach. Besides, it does not
consider an imperfect competition among strategic producers
in the LMP-based market mechanism and, while it quantifies
the budget deficit, it does not explore any mechanism to
recover revenue-adequacy of the market operator.
Even though applicability of VCG to electricity markets has
been studied before in the aforementioned papers, to the best
of the authors’ knowledge, adapting a VCG mechanism in a
two-stage stochastic electricity market, additionally consider-
ing a budget imbalance redistribution scheme, forms a novel
contribution to existing power systems literature. To this end,
the contribution of this paper is summarized below:
• a VCG auction is applied to a two-stage stochastic market
and comprehensively compared against the LMP market
under both perfect and imperfect competition,
• potential budget imbalance under the VCG mechanism is
quantified for two case studies and a novel mechanism
for partially recovering revenue-adequacy in the market
is proposed,
• and, finally, the impact of wind power penetration on
the market outcomes, and more specifically on budget
imbalance, is evaluated for increasing levels of wind
power penetration.
C. Paper Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II describes the main features along with the considered
market-clearing mechanisms, and proposes a new mecha-
nism for partially redistributing budget imbalance. Section III
presents a case study considering multiple conventional and
wind power producers that compete in a network-constrained
market. Scalability issues of the VCG market mechanism
are explored in Section IV based on a 118-bus test case.
Finally, Section V concludes the paper and discusses future
perspectives.
II. FORMULATION
A. Features and Assumptions
Throughout this work, two market-clearing mechanisms are
explored, i.e., the VCG market mechanism and the LMP mar-
ket mechanism, considering a stochastic two-stage electricity
market. Three different models are, then, constructed in order
to allow for a thorough comparison of the two mechanisms.
The three market models are described below:
1) Model “Competitive LMP”, refers to a perfectly com-
petitive electricity market, cleared based on the LMP
mechanism. In the corresponding model, participants
are considered to be price-takers and submit their true
cost/utility to the market operator, who clears a stochastic
two-stage market accordingly [12], [13]. This is an ideal
model, which is used as a benchmark.
2) Model “Strategic LMP”, corresponds to an LMP market
where strategic producers are present. Under this context,
an iterative diagonalization approach is followed [25],
in order to identify the equilibrium of the market with
respect to producers’ strategic offers. Then, market op-
erator clears the market based on producers’ offers and
demands’ bids at the equilibrium.
3) Model “VCG”, consists of a mechanism based on the
VCG auction theory, i.e., each producer and each con-
sumer is paid/charged proportionally to the impact it has
on social welfare.
Under the scope of this study, a number of necessary assump-
tions are made. An energy-only market is considered which is
modeled as a stochastic two-stage DA market, in order to bet-
ter capture the uncertainty of wind power generation [13]. All
models are solved enforcing transmission network constraints,
using a lossless DC power flow approach [12]. Inter-temporal
constraints, e.g., ramping limits of conventional units, are not
enforced and thus a single-hour auction is considered. The
operational cost of wind power producers is considered to be
4zero. In Strategic LMP model, producers behave strategically
with respect to their price offers of conventional generation,
but not regarding power quantities and wind power generation.
Finally, demand is considered to be elastic to price as well as
deterministic to exclude additional sources of uncertainty.
B. Market-Clearing Under the LMP Mechanism
A market with increased wind power penetration is inves-
tigated. Thus, to achieve better DA schedules, a two-stage
stochastic market-clearing approach is followed, which clears
DA market anticipating potential RT adjustments [12], [13].
The LMP market-clearing mechanism ensures maximum
efficiency, under the assumption that market participants are
price-takers, i.e., do not exercise market power. This leads
to a well-defined model, where the market is cleared based
on true generation costs and demand utilities. The objective
function of the two-stage stochastic market-clearing represents
the maximization of expected social welfare, i.e., E
ω
[SW ],
which consists of DA and expected (based on a wind power
forecast) RT social welfare, expressed by (1) below:
Max
x,yω
{ Eω[SW ]︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
d∈D
Ud(x)− E
ω
[∑
i∈I
Ci(x, yω) +
∑
d∈D
Vd(yω)
]}
(1a)
subject to
h(x, yω) = 0 (1b)
g(x, yω) ≤ 0 (1c)
where D is the set of demands, I is the set of conventional
producers, ω is an index for scenarios, x is the vector of
scenario-independent (here-and-now) DA variables and yω is
the vector of scenario-dependent (wait-and-see) RT variables.
Furthermore, Ud(x) is the utility of demand d, Ci(x, yω)
is generation cost of producer i and Vd(yω) is the shedding
cost of demand d. In constraints (1b)-(1c), h(.) and g(.) are
functions of the decision vectors x, yω and define a number of
equality and inequality constraints. The detailed formulation
of (1) is available in [26].
In case of a perfectly competitive DA market, terms Ud(x)
and Ci(x, yω) in (1) correspond to the actual values of de-
mand utilities and generation costs, forming the “Competitive
LMP” model. In practice, the assumption of a perfectly com-
petitive market does not usually hold and electricity markets
are challenged by the presence of strategic producers [27],
which may offer at prices different than their actual production
costs. Thus, an increasing number of research efforts has been
focusing on investigating market power in electricity markets
under various setups, e.g., [28]–[31].
To account for strategic behaviors in the market, we addi-
tionally investigate a market with multiple strategic conven-
tional producers. For each power producer, a bilevel optimiza-
tion model is constructed, the upper-level of which maximizes
producer’s expected profit and the lower-level maximizes ex-
pected social welfare based on the same market mechanism as
in (1). The formulation of such a bilevel problem for strategic
producer i is briefly given by (2):
{
Max
αi
{
E
ω
[Πi] = Π
DA
i (αi,x) + E
ω
[ΠRTi (αi,x, yω)]
}
(2a)
subject to:
Optimization problem (1a)− (1c) (2b)}
,∀i ∈ I.
where objective function (2a) consists of the summation
of DA and expected RT profits, i.e, ΠDAi (αi,x) and
E
ω
[ΠRTi (αi,x, yω)], respectively. Furthermore, αi is a variable
corresponding to the price offer for conventional unit i, which
is not necessarily equal to its marginal cost. Thus, Ci(x, yω)
is replaced in (2b) by αi.
The solution of the aforementioned bilevel model identifies
the strategic price offers for each producer. Then, an iterative
diagonalization approach is followed, to identify the equilib-
rium of the game among all producers [25], [31]. A more
detailed presentation of “Strategic LMP” model is available in
[26].
C. Market-Clearing Under the VCG Mechanism
The first step of applying VCG in the electricity market
is to ensure efficient economic dispatch by using model (1),
which maximizes social welfare given a perfectly competitive
market. Note that VCG ensures a perfectly competitive market,
through a payment scheme which aligns the objectives of in-
dividual participants with the maximization of social welfare.
Both Competitive LMP and VCG models yield the same
DA and RT dispatch but different market-clearing prices. The
LMPs in the former model are obtained as dual variables of
power balance conditions, which are unique for all players
within a transmission node. However, the market prices for
any two agents in VCG mechanism might be different, despite
being located at the same node.
The principle of payments under the VCG mechanism is
fundamentally different than the one in the conventional LMP-
based markets today. This mechanism pays each producer
based on the economic value that it brings to the market,
identified by the difference of the market’s social welfare with
and without that producer. This definition differentiates the
value of production of two producers, even though they are
located at the same node. For example, assume one producer
is flexible, while the other one at the same node is inflexible.
In an energy-only setup in which the producers are only paid
based on their energy production (no capacity committed for
reserve), although both producers generate the same good,
the absence of the former may cause load shedding or wind
spillage under some scenarios, showing the economic value
of its flexibility to the market. Therefore, under the VCG
scheme, the flexible producer may deserve to be rewarded
more than the inflexible one. Another example would be
considering two producers that have comparable marginal
costs but considerably different scheduled power. In that case,
the absence of the producer with the higher scheduled power
is more probable to create the need for scheduling more
expensive generation in the market compared to the smaller
producer. Thus, its absence from the market will have a greater
5impact on social welfare than the smaller producer and, thus,
it will be paid proportionally higher. The payment mechanism
under VCG auction is explained below.
Let producer i be the one whose revenue is to be calculated.
The VCG payment scheme is designed to endogenize the
social welfare function into producer i’s profit-maximizing
function. The latter is achieved by paying the producer the
difference between: (i) the expected social welfare when all
agents participate in the market increased by producer i’s
reported operational cost, and (ii) the expected social welfare
when producer i does not participate in the market. The
expected social welfare when i does not participate in the
market, denoted by E
ω
[SW−i], is derived by the solution of
(1), excluding producer i from the auction. Thus, the expected
payment to producer i (expected revenue of that producer), i.e.,
E
ω
[RVi], is calculated by (3) below:
E
ω
[RV i] =
γ︷ ︸︸ ︷[
E
ω
[SW ] + E
ω
[Ci(x, yω)]
]
−E
ω
[SW−i] (3)
where E
ω
[SW ] is the expected social welfare of all agents
including i, E
ω
[SW−i] is the expected market social welfare
when producer i is excluded from the auction at the optimal
point, and E
ω
[Ci(x, yω)] is the reported operational cost of
producer i for its expected generation. Note that, the term
indicated by γ is the expected social welfare considering the
contribution of all agents except i
(
i.e., the term -E
ω
[Ci(x, yω)]
is included in E
ω
[SW ]
)
. To calculate E
ω
[SW−i], we solve the
market-clearing problem in (1), while agent i is excluded from
the market. The value of the objective function at the optimal
point is equal to E
ω
[SW−i].
Similarly, we define the expected revenue of each wind
producer. Note that the operational cost of wind generation
is considered zero for all wind producers.
Lastly, the expected payment received by consumer d is
given by (4) below:
E
ω
[RV d] = E
ω
[SW−d]−
[
E
ω
[SW ]− Ud(x)
]
(4)
where E
ω
[SW−d] is the expected market social welfare when
consumer d is excluded from the auction, E
ω
[SW ] is the
expected social welfare of all agents including d and Ud(x)
is the cost consumer d is willing to pay for its consumption.
Under this payment scheme, it can be proved that agents’
dominant strategy is to report their true preferences, i.e.,
true generation cost and demand utility, leading to maximum
social welfare (see [26] for the proof). Furthermore, producers’
expected profit can be obtained by subtracting from (3) their
corresponding generation costs, which under truthful submis-
sion of costs becomes equal to (5):
E
ω
[Πi] = E
ω
[SW ]− E
ω
[SW−i] (5)
Based on (5), producers’ expected profits are always non-
negative, ensuring cost-recovery in the market. The proofs
regarding incentive-compatibility and cost-recovery for the
VCG market mechanism can be found in [26].
D. Budget Imbalance Redistribution Under the VCG Mecha-
nism
In this subsection, we explore a novel redistribution ap-
proach, which aims at ex-post recovering budget imbalance.
Budget imbalance is the result of aggregate consumers’
charges not being equal to the producers payments, thus
leading the market operator with either an economic deficit
(producer’s payments are higher than consumers’ charges) or
with an economic surplus (producers’ payments are lower than
consumers’ charges). The proposed mechanism charges agents
that are responsible for the negative budget imbalance and
rewards the ones that contribute towards revenue-adequacy.
Motivated by the relevant economics literature for single-sided
markets [22], we explore a redistribution mechanism adapted
to a double-sided electricity market. The proposed redistri-
bution scheme is able to distinguish each agent’s positive
(negative) contribution towards revenue-adequacy and rewards
(charges) them with a corresponding additional payment.
Qualitatively, the proposed budget imbalance redistribution
scheme is described by the flowchart in Fig. 1. The first step
is to solve the original VCG market-clearing problem and
calculate the value of budget imbalance (S0), i.e., the dif-
ference between aggregate payments received from demands
and aggregate revenues of producers. In order to propose
a fair mechanism for charging this additional payment to
market participants, we first investigate the contribution of
each market agent on the budget imbalance. Thus, we solve
the market-clearing problem excluding each time market agent
n, calculating the corresponding budget imbalance. The new
budget imbalance is then denoted by S−n. Note that agent n
can be either a consumer or a producer. If the resulted budget
imbalance is positive, i.e., S−n > 0, and the initial budget
imbalance is negative, i.e., S0 < 0, then agent n’s participation
in the market contributes towards negative budget imbalance
and it should be charged. On the other hand, in cases that initial
budget imbalance is positive, i.e., S0 > 0, then if excluding
agent n leads to lower budget imbalance, agent n contributes
towards positive budget imbalance and should be rewarded
accordingly.
Note that the proposed redistribution scheme indicates the
impact that each agent solely has on budget imbalance. If,
according to the mechanism, an agent is not identified to
affect budget imbalance, then its profit is not affected by
the redistribution mechanism. For example, in a case with
negative budget imbalance, if excluding agent n from the
market still leads to negative budget imbalance, then agent n
is neither charged nor rewarded. In that sense, if agent n’s sole
participation causes a budget deficit (identified by exploring
the budget imbalance without agent n’s participation), then
no other agent is either charged or rewarded. Thus, we can
distinguish which agent’s participation jeopardizes revenue-
adequacy and which helps towards it. The next step is to define
the exact redistribution payment of each agent. This additional
payment (positive or negative) corresponds to agent’s individ-
ual contribution on revenue-adequacy, in order to redistribute
6 
o Solve VCG market-clearing including all market 
agents (𝑛 = 1,… ,𝑁) 
o Calculate budget imbalance 𝑆0 
o Solve VCG market-clearing excluding market agent 𝑛 
o Calculate budget imbalance 𝑆−𝑛  
𝑆−𝑛 >0 
𝑆0 < 0 
𝑆−𝑛 < 𝑆0 
Charged: 
𝑅𝑀𝑛 =
𝑆−𝑛
𝑁ൗ  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Rewarded: 
𝑅𝑀𝑛 =
𝑆−𝑛
𝑁ൗ  
End 
Figure 1. The proposed budget imbalance redistribution mechanism for the
VCG market
budget imbalance proportionally. To this end, the additional
payment derived by the redistribution mechanism for a market
with negative budget imbalance is calculated as the surplus
associated with each agent n’s absence in the market, divided
by the number of participating agents N . Note that agent n’s
redistribution payment, i.e., RMn, is constrained to be less than
or equal to agent n’s profit/utility, in order to maintain cost-
recovery. Cost-recovery of each agent is imposed under the
ex-post redistribution mechanism as an explicit observation
on the payment calculation. More specifically, we calculate
each agent’s redistribution payment and then check whether
its total profit (i.e., profit in the market plus the profit/cost
from the redistribution stage) is positive or negative. If the
latter is positive, then we keep the redistribution payment as
it is. However, in case the total profit is negative, then the
redistribution payment is adjusted to be equal to the profit of
the agent from the market, leading to a zero total profit for
the agent. Similarly, in a market with positive budget imbal-
ance, i.e., revenue-adequacy is satisfied, each agent that helps
towards increasing positive budget imbalance is rewarded by
the surplus associated with its absence in the market divided
by the number of participating agents. The proposed approach
has the following features/benefits:
1) It redistributes budget imbalance of the market in a pro-
portional way, rewarding agents that contribute towards
revenue-adequacy and charging agents that have negative
impact on it.
2) It does not affect VCG market efficiency, since DA
schedules and RT adjustments are exactly the same as
in a perfectly competitive market.
3) It discourages strategic behaviors aiming to main-
tain VCG incentive-compatibility; redistribution payment
RMn is independent of agent n’s decisions, being the
budget imbalance when agent n does not participate in
the market.
4) It ensures ex-post cost-recovery by constraining the re-
distribution payment to be less than or equal to the
corresponding agent’s profit.
Note that, as mentioned before, no mechanism is capable of
achieving individual rationality, efficiency and budget balance
at the same time for general valuation functions [21]. Thus,
the proposed redistribution approach cannot always guarantee
full recovery of the negative budget imbalance, i.e., it might
just reduce it.
III. CASE STUDY: IEEE 24-BUS TEST SYSTEM
A. Data
A case study based on the IEEE 24-bus reliability test
system [32] is considered, modified in order to better ac-
commodate wind farms [33]. The considered total load is
2,207 MW, consisting of 17 demands (namely, D1-D17) with
properties as listed in [33], while demand bids are elastic and
the value of lost load is e200/MWh. From the generation side,
12 conventional power units (namely, G1-G12) are considered,
with total installed capacity of 3,375 MW. Each conventional
unit offers at a quantity identical to its installed capacity and at
a given price. In addition to conventional units, we consider
6 wind power units located in different buses, as proposed
in [33]. Wind power scenarios are sampled from a beta
distribution, as in [34], with shape parameters (α, β)=(5,1). An
initial number of 2,000 wind power scenarios are generated
and then reduced to 3 using K-means clustering [35] to
decrease computational cost, which is challenging for Strategic
LMP model. Lastly, multiple cases are evaluated for increasing
wind power penetration, i.e., expected wind power generation
divided by total load, ranging from 17% to 50%.
B. Market-Clearing Outcomes Under VCG and LMP Mecha-
nisms
The results for expected social welfare versus increasing
levels of wind power penetration are presented in Fig. 2.
Incentive-compatible VCG (before redistribution) as well as
LMP under perfect competition lead to the same social
welfare, due to the truthful submission of costs from the
generation side. Note that truthfulness is an assumption for
the LMP model but a dominant strategy for the VCG. The
corresponding curve under imperfect competition in the LMP
market is, as expected, lower for all wind penetration levels.
Naturally, social welfare increases with wind power penetra-
tion for all three market models.
Due to space limitation, agent-specific results are presented
only for agents with particular interest. Thus, Fig. 3 compares
the profits for selected conventional producers across the
three market models. The competitive LMP model is used
as a benchmark for comparison, thus it is plotted as a line
against the bar plot of the VCG and LMP strategic models.
It is observed that producers’ expected profit under VCG
model is equal to (e.g., producer G10) or greater than (e.g.,
producers G2 and G8) that in Competitive LMP. Additionally,
there are cases where a producer has zero profit under LMP
mechanism (being the marginal producer), but its profit under
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Figure 2. Expected market social welfare versus increasing levels of wind
power penetration. Expected social welfare in both Competitive LMP and VCG
models is the same since they end up in identical dispatch results; the only
difference is the pricing scheme used.
VCG mechanism is positive, e.g., producer G8. This indicates
the main difference in the two payment mechanisms; VCG
payments depend on the contribution of each generator in
social welfare maximization and not on a unique price that is
set by the marginal producer. It is additionally observed from
Fig. 3 that strategic offering could still be more beneficial for
some producers, e.g., G8 and G10.
Regarding wind power producers, VCG can be more ben-
eficial compared to Competitive LMP. This can be observed
by Fig. 4, and the comparatively equal or higher profits under
VCG model, compared to Competitive LMP. However, it is
also observed that Strategic LMP may lead to the highest
profit. Wind producers, despite being competitive in the mar-
ket, still get benefited by the strategic behavior of conventional
producers under Strategic LMP model.
Similar to all other agents in the market, the location of
wind power units might have an impact on the outcomes
of the VCG mechanism. The absence of a wind power unit
with a zero marginal cost will definitely decrease the market’s
social welfare. However, depending on the location of wind
power unit, this absence may either intensify or diminish the
congestion. In the former case (more severe congestion), the
economic value of wind power unit, and thus the payment of
market operator to this unit, will even increase. However, in
the latter case, the wind power unit will have a comparatively
lower economic value, leading to a lower payment to this unit.
Lastly, payments received from selected demands are pre-
sented in Fig. 5. It is observed that demands are expected to
make lower payments under VCG mechanism, reflecting their
positive impact on social welfare. Thus, VCG mechanism is
more beneficial for consumers as well, compared to the LMP
model under both strategic and competitive setups. Demands’
payments do not change considerably with increasing pene-
tration of wind power for each model, due to their relatively
high offer prices.
Market budget imbalance is presented in Fig. 6 versus in-
creasing levels of wind power penetration. Budget imbalance is
defined as the difference between aggregate payments received
from demands and aggregate payments made to producers.
Note that, the LMP market model is revenue-adequate in
expectation only, i.e., the budget imbalance is always non-
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Figure 3. Expected profit of selected conventional producers versus increasing
levels of wind power penetration
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Figure 4. Expected profit of selected wind producers versus increasing levels
of wind power penetration
negative in expectation, but it might not be per scenario [12].
In this case study it is observed that, considering a congested
network, LMP model results in positive budget imbalance
(both black and blue lines), which decreases with increasing
penetration of wind power. A positive budget imbalance in the
LMP mechanism is attributed to the so-called congestion rent
payments in the congested network.
On the other hand, VCG pricing is not nodal but individually
derived per participant and, thus, market budget imbalance
is not related explicitly to congestion rent. In Fig. 6 it is
observed that market budget imbalance under VCG is neg-
ative for low wind power penetration. This is explained by
the comparatively lower payments received from demands
compared to payments made to producers, both wind and
conventional. This outcome changes for scenarios with higher
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Figure 5. Expected payment of selected demands versus increasing levels of
wind power penetration
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Figure 6. Budget imbalance of the market in expectation. Revenue-adequacy
refers to the case of having non-negative budget imbalance.
than 23% wind penetration, where demand payments remain
at the same levels but payments to conventional producers
decrease resulting in positive budget imbalance. Following the
increasing wind penetration, payments to wind producers also
increase and, thereafter, market budget imbalance decreases
accordingly, though remaining positive.
Prices in LMP markets can be different per node due to
congestion in the network. Recall that energy prices in the
stochastic LMP models anticipate probable network bottle-
necks in RT operation and, thus, DA and RT prices are strongly
coupled. On the other hand, VCG prices are defined by a
different payment scheme and depend on the contribution
of each generator in social welfare maximization, thus not
forming a unique price which is set by the marginal producer.
To clarify this with an example, let us consider producers
G11 and G12, which are located at the same node. For wind
penetration levels equal to 17%, producer G11’s payment
corresponds to a market price of e13.56/MWh. On the other
hand, producer G12, located at the same node with G11,
receives a DA payment which corresponds to a market price of
e13.69/MWh. The price difference, even relatively small, is
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Figure 7. Conventional generation weighted average market prices versus
increasing levels of wind power penetration
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Figure 8. Demands’ weighted average market prices versus increasing levels
of wind power penetration
explained by the fact that the two producers have comparable
marginal costs but different capacities. Thus, an absence of
G12 from the market would require the scheduling of a larger
amount of more expensive generation compared to the absence
of G11, causing a comparatively greater impact on social
welfare. Concluding, despite that producers G11 and G12 are
connected to the same node of the system, there is no unique
nodal price that defines their payment under the VCG.
For illustration reasons, weighted average prices for ag-
gregate conventional generation and aggregate demands are
presented in Figs. 7 and 8, respectively. Weighted average
prices are the summation of all individual prices multiplied
by the ratio of individual and total traded power in DA. It is
observed that weighted average conventional generation prices
are higher for VCG mechanism for low wind power penetration
and then become lower than the corresponding prices for
Competitive LMP. Lastly, results for the demand-side prices
show that for high levels of wind power penetration, VCG
demand-side prices decrease considerably. Note that, up to
27% of wind power penetration the weighted average prices of
conventional generation under VCG decrease, while the cor-
responding demand-side prices remain relatively unchanged.
This explains the increasing trend of budget imbalance for low
levels of wind power penetration, which accordingly becomes
positive.
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Figure 9. Budget imbalance in expectation before and after the proposed
redistribution of budget imbalance versus increasing levels of wind power
penetration.
C. Ex-post Budget Imbalance Redistribution Under the VCG
Mechanism
In this subsection we apply the proposed redistribution
scheme of subsection II-D to the presented case study. Fig.
9 presents the results of the corrected budget imbalance fol-
lowing the redistribution mechanism (denoted by VCG+RM)
and compares it with Competitive LMP and VCG market
results before redistribution. Regarding the resulting budget
imbalance we observe that the negative budget imbalance for
low wind power penetration levels is fully recovered after
redistribution, and becomes positive. Furthermore, rewarding
market agents that contribute towards revenue-adequacy leads
to decreased budget imbalance for the case where revenue-
adequacy was met prior redistribution. The resulted positive
budget imbalance of the proposed redistribution mechanism
should only be considered as a better approximation of budget
balance and is not associated with grid owner payments.
Fig. 10 presents the profits of selected conventional pro-
ducers after budget redistribution. It is observed that producer
G2 is mostly affected by the redistribution scheme and its
profit decreases to levels lower than the corresponding under
Competitive LMP mechanism for the lowest wind power
penetration scenario. However, producer G2 has increased
profits for all other scenarios of wind power penetration.
Generally, most producers still benefit from VCG model after
redistribution compared to Competitive LMP. On the other
hand, wind producers participate the least to the redistribution
scheme and, thus, their profits do not change considerably.
Generally, wind producers still benefit of a marginal increase
in their profits after redistribution for high levels of wind
power penetration.
Finally, demands’ payments after redistribution are pre-
sented in Fig. 11 for selected consumers. It was observed that
some demands, e.g., consumer D16, have slightly increased
payments after redistribution for low wind penetration levels
but the opposite for higher penetration levels. In general all de-
mands are still exposed to higher payments under Competitive
LMP market, even after the additional redistribution payments.
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Figure 10. Expected profit of selected conventional producers before and
after implementing the proposed redistribution of budget imbalance versus
increasing levels of wind power penetration
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Figure 11. Expected payment of selected demands before and after imple-
menting the proposed redistribution of budget imbalance versus increasing
levels of wind power penetration
D. Practical Implementation and Computational Complexity
As already explained, both LMP and VCG mechanisms use
the same optimization tool for clearing the market and their
only difference is the way they price electricity. Therefore, the
data and information availability for the practical implemen-
tation of VCG mechanism would essentially be the same with
the traditional LMP-based market mechanism.
Under VCG, there is no uniform price and this mechanism
may end up in different prices for different agents. However,
the volatility of these individual prices might be considerably
high, and thus, may lead to unpredictable prices and profitabil-
ity for the market participants. By definition though, market
participants are not able to exercise market power and are
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incentivized to offer their true preferences, irrespective of the
expected market price. At the same time, cost recovery is also
guaranteed under such a scheme and power producers will not
face any loss from participating in the market.
Regarding the computational burden in VCG mechanism,
based on its definition, the market-clearing optimization prob-
lem needs to be solved several times, i.e., equal to the number
of the participating agents (each time, the corresponding agent
is out of the market) plus one (the case under which all agents
exist in the market). However, all these optimization problems
can be solved in parallel, since they are all independent. There-
fore, compared to the LMP mechanism, the VCG one does
not bring considerable computational complexity. The same
explanation is valid for the proposed ex-post redistribution
mechanism, since it is solved for each agent independently
and in parallel. In the following section we provide a larger
case study which aims to explore the scalability of VCG
mechanism under a power system with more market players
and an increased number of wind power scenarios.
IV. CASE STUDY: IEEE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM
The case study is based on the IEEE 118-bus test system
[36] and, in contrast to Section III, the solution of the
”Strategic LMP” model is ignored since it is not relevant
in evaluating scalability of neither of the two mechanisms.
In this case study, the considered total load is 3,733 MW,
consisting of 91 demands (namely, D1-D91) with properties
as listed in [36], while demand bids are elastic and the value
of lost load is e200/MWh. From the generation side, 19
conventional power units (namely, G1-G19) are considered,
with total installed capacity of 4,377 MW. Each conventional
unit offers at a quantity identical to its installed capacity
and at a given price. In addition to conventional units, we
consider 17 wind power units located in different buses, as
proposed in [36]. Wind power scenarios are sampled from a
beta distribution with shape parameters (α, β)=(5,1). An initial
number of 2,000 wind power scenarios are generated and then
reduced to 50, similarly to Section III. This is a considerably
greater number of scenarios compared to the case study of
Section III, aiming to evaluate computational efficiency of the
explored mechanism. Lastly, the case study is built on a system
with wind power penetration of 22%.
In this case study we compare the results of the VCG model,
before and after the redistribution, with the corresponding re-
sults of the Competitive LMP. The expected profits of selected
conventional producers are presented in Fig. 12. Similarly to
the previous section it is observed that profits are generally
higher for conventional producers under the VCG mechanism,
with the difference ranging from marginal (e.g., producer
G4) to considerably high (e.g., producer G1). Regarding the
results of the redistribution mechanism, expected profits for
conventional producers are marginally lower than VCG and
still higher than the Competitive LMP.
In Fig. 13, the expected profits of selected wind producers
are presented for the two models. It is observed that in this case
study and under the considered wind penetration level, changes
in the expected profits of wind power producers are not
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Figure 12. Expected profits of selected conventional producers for both LMP
and VCG (before and after redistribution), based on the IEEE 118-bus test
system
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Figure 13. Expected profits of selected wind producers for both LMP and
VCG (before and after redistribution), based on the IEEE 118-bus test system
significant. However, depending on the location of the wind
producer, there can be an increase in profits under the VCG
model as observed in the case of producers W12 and W14.
Similarly to the results for the conventional producers, the ex-
post redistribution mechanism is not leading to considerable
changes on the profits of wind power producers, since the
redistribution charges are distributed among a higher number
of market players.
Lastly, in Fig. 14 we present the expected payments of
selected demands. The results lead to the same conclusions
as the previous section, with decreased demand payments
under the VCG model, but not always considerable. It is
also observed that demand payments do not considerably
change after redistribution for this case study. This result partly
explains the fact that negative budget imbalance, even though it
is reduced after redistribution, still remains high, as presented
in Table II. Social welfare is identical through all the three
cases since the generation dispatch is identical.
Concerning computational efficiency, for this case study,
we have used solver CPLEX under GAMS, associated with
Matlab R2015b on a Windows 10, 64 bit operating system
with 2 cores processor running at 2.4 GHz and 12GB of RAM.
Computational times for the LMP model range between 8-10
seconds, while for VCG, either before or after redistribution,
computational times remain 5-10 seconds per each of 128
optimization models, which can be solved in parallel (127
market-clearing models excluding one agent each time plus
a market-clearing model considering all agents).
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Figure 14. Expected payments of selected demands for both LMP and VCG
(before and after redistribution), based on the IEEE 118-bus test system
TABLE II
MARKET RESULTS BASED ON THE IEEE 118-BUS TEST SYSTEM
Budget Imbalance
(in exp.) [e ]
Social Welfare
(in exp.) [e ]
Competitive LMP 3,093 343,550
VCG -11,009 343,550
VCG+RM -8,584 343,550
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
A. Conclusions
Driven by the importance of efficiency in electricity mar-
kets, this work explores a VCG auction adaptation on a
two-stage stochastic market. The stochastic two-stage model
ensures maximum efficiency under high wind penetration,
while VCG contributes towards a transparent and incentive-
compatible payment scheme. Then the proposed mechanism
is compared against traditional LMP setup, under both perfect
and imperfect competition. A case study is presented, which
numerically concludes in the following points:
1) The VCG mechanism achieves through incentive-
compatibility maximum social welfare, equal to the ideal
LMP model. On the other hand, imperfect competition
may lead to decreased social welfare due to the presence
of strategic behaviors.
2) Both conventional and wind producers’ profits are higher
in VCG mechanism compared to the LMP, but might be
even higher under the LMP setup considering imperfect
competition. Conventional producers’ expected profits
generally decrease for both mechanisms as wind power
penetration increases.
3) Demands’ payments are lower under VCG mechanism, a
condition which confirms that consumers are benefiting
from an incentive-compatible mechanism. Higher demand
payments are observed under the LMP setup considering
the presence of strategic producers.
4) Budget imbalance in the market is positive under the LMP
mechanism, being the result of the so-called congestion
rent. On the other hand, VCG mechanism may lead to
negative budget imbalance for low levels of wind penetra-
tion, which becomes positive as wind power penetration
increases.
Negative budget imbalance is the main shortcoming of
VCG mechanism, necessitating an ex-post solution for budget
recovery. To this end, a novel budget redistribution mechanism
is proposed which aims at partially recovering market budget
imbalance by imposing additional payments to market partic-
ipants. The proposed approach rewards agents that contribute
towards revenue-adequacy and charges the ones having nega-
tive impact. The proposed redistribution mechanism succeeds
to partially recover revenue-adequacy in the market while
making it practically difficult for agents to violate the rest of
the market properties. Finally, producers and consumers are
still benefited compared to the LMP market, for high levels of
wind power penetration.
B. Future Perspectives
The proposed ex-post redistribution mechanism has been
applied on the expected budget imbalance of the market.
However, it is worth mentioning that it can be used in a similar
way to charge/pay the market agents not in expectation but per
each individual scenario. This means that the contribution of
each agent to create a budget imbalance under each scenario
can be calculated, and then a similar mechanism can be used
to pay/charge them. However, we anticipate that this revised
mechanism may end up in a less efficient redistribution mech-
anism compared to the one in which the agents’ contribution to
budget imbalance is calculated in expectation, which however
requires further investigation.
Congestion rent payments (and financial transmission
rights) are not explored in this paper and exceed its scope.
However, it is essential to find a rigorous solution to calculate
the economic value of transmission grid under the VCG
mechanism. This value needs to be properly defined, which
will eventually build a basis for the market operator’s payment
to the grid owner or the financial transmission right holders.
An additional concern regarding the VCG mechanism is
whether existing (or even prospective) producers are able to
anticipate the economic viability of their assets, given the
volatility and unpredictability of prices under such a payment
scheme. Such an uncertainty might have significant impacts
on the evolution of the market, which are not straightforward
to predict and would need additional investigations, which are
left for future research.
Lastly, future research on VCG application in electricity
markets should explore how the risk aversion of producers
may impact market payments under the VCG mechanism, as
in [37], [38] for LMP markets, and investigate the possibility
of risk trading among market agents [39].
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